New political alignments

Political and social movements, no matter how insignificant, produce certain sentiments and mindsets. The lawyers’ and civil society’s movement for the restoration of the judiciary, still on the march, has caused a significant degree of socio-political mobilisation of the urban middle classes

Perhaps it is too early to judge the recasting of political alliances among the socio-political forces of Pakistan. At the moment, the political lines between different players are blurred, and are not as clear as when the lawyers, the then opposition parties and civil society launched their movement against the imposition of a second martial law by Pervez Musharraf in November 2007. Earlier, the Charter of Democracy signed by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif drew the political line between ‘democratic’ and ‘authoritarian’ forces in the country.

The issues of authoritarianism and democracy in Pakistan are complex, as are the political relationships and networks between classes, institutions and political groupings that are ever willing to change positions for immediate political benefits. Under our brand of pragmatic politics, everyone is ready to strike a new political deal.

Musharraf, for all his political faults, understood the opportunism of the Pakistani political class and made effective, in some instances lasting, political deals to consolidate his power. Even during emergency rule, which didn’t last very long, he had a good section of the political forces on his side.

It was the popular democratic mood at the time of the February 18, 2008 elections that raised serious questions about Musharraf’s rule. His confrontation with the judiciary and the media proved to be a fatal mistake that led to his, and his political allies’, undoing.

Political and social movements, no matter how insignificant, produce certain sentiments and mindsets. The lawyers’ and civil society’s movement for the restoration of the judiciary, still on the march, has caused a significant degree of socio-political mobilisation of the urban middle classes. Nawaz Sharif was quick to capture this sentiment in the more developed parts of Punjab, but the PPP was not left behind in owning and participating in the movement either. However, the political dividends of this participation were meagre for the PPP as compared to the PMLN.

There were other, not so insignificant, factors that played a major role in bringing the PPP to power for the fourth time: a stable social constituency of support in different parts of the country; its image as the party of the poor; and the great sacrifice of Benazir Bhutto.

It was the emotional factor, the mixture of grief and resilience among PPP leaders and workers, that led to a big turnout of its supporters on election day, and that was what mattered in the electoral results for the party.

The old political divide between the ‘democratic’ political forces and their bases of social support even today remains unchanged. At the national level, the divide is between the PPP and the PMLN. Ethnic and religious groups are also influenced by the strong pull of the two parties, depending on their political fortunes.

Then what has really changed?

The real change is in the character of the lawyers’ and civil society’s movement, their political agenda, and their flexibility to align with any political group that would lend support to their cause. This is one of the great social movements of Pakistan that mobilised on an issue-basis, i.e. independence of the judiciary and restoration of unfairly deposed judges. Further, a variety of political parties, either for political gains or conviction, support the movement.

Even bringing these issues to the forefront of the Pakistani political consciousness is a major contribution to democratic thought and practice in the country. At least among the urban middle and professional classes, there is the very strong belief that democratic transition will remain flawed, at best incomplete, unless the judiciary is free.

The lawyers’ and civil society’s movement is non-partisan, and started off with the support of every party and faction in the political opposition. However, there is an irony in the character of the movement: as far as political ideas are concerned, it is liberal-secular, and many of its prominent members were part of the socio-political forces that founded and supported the PPP.

So naturally, it seems to be disillusioned by the PPP leaders, whom it accuses of stalling on the issue of restoring the deposed judges. The movement believes that it has exhausted all possibilities of negotiation with the government, and feels that the only way out is political pressure through the Long March and the indefinite sit-in at Constitution Avenue in Islamabad.

There is a question mark about how the deposed judges will be restored and how the independence of the judiciary will be ensured at the end of the Long March and dharna. This will be a major political event that will be carefully watched by everyone in the country, as well as by the countries that want to gauge Pakistan’s political climate for their own national interest.

But the real significance of the dharna is in another question mark over the realignment of socio-political forces in the country. The PMLN has, finally, after some wavering and rethinking about its commitment to the movement, decided to join the dharna, declaring that it is now willing to “go beyond” this event.

What this means is that the PMLN, which a few days ago was questioning the utility of dharna, wants to throw its full weight behind the movement regardless of the political consequences, especially for its government in Punjab.

If this happens, then clearly, we will see a new realignment of activist urban social and political forces. This is going to be a very different kind of alignment, issue-specific but not grassroots-level, and essentially born out of common political frustrations that may not be enduring.

As soon as the issue of the restoration of judges is resolved, which looks unlikely, or the government is toppled, which we hope is not the aim and which cannot be accomplished short of a ‘revolution’, the alignment between the movement and the PMLN and its traditional political allies may remain intact. There is also an innate fear that the social movement may not be able to stand clear of the lines of political confrontation and may become tangled in them with possible divisions along partisan political lines.

Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at rasul@lums.edu.pk